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Due to potential capability of providing unconditional security, arbitrated quantum signature
(AQS) schemes, whose implementation depends on the participation of a trusted third party, received
intense attention in the past decade. Recently, some typical AQS schemes were cryptanalyzed and
improved. In this paper, we analyze security property of some AQS schemes and show that all
the previous AQS schemes, no matter original or improved, are still insecure in the sense that the
messages and the corresponding signatures can be exchanged among different receivers, allowing
the receivers to deny accepting the signature of an appointed message. Some further improvement
methods on the AQS schemes are also discussed.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Digital signature, as an electronic equivalent to hand-
written signature in online transactions, is a very impor-
tant cryptographic primitive and has many different uses.
For instance, it can be used to authenticate the identity
of the originator, ensure data integrity, and provide non-
repudiation service. At present, classical (digital) signa-
ture has been widely used in electronic commerce and
other related fields. Unfortunately, most existing clas-
sical signature schemes whose security depends on the
difficulty of solving some hard mathematical problems
were threatened by quantum computation [1]. Therefore,
researchers turn to investigate its quantum counterpart
with the hope that quantum signature can become an al-
ternative to classical signature and provide unconditional
security.
Generally, a quantum signature scheme is believed to
be unconditionally secure if the following two basic re-
quirements are satisfied even though powerful quantum
cheating strategies exist and unlimited computing re-
sources are available: 1) the attacker (or the malicious
receiver) cannot forge the signature; 2) disavowal of the
signatory and the receiver is impossible. In 2002, un-
conditionally secure quantum signature was proved to be
impossible by Barnum et al. [2]. Even the result is disap-
pointing, Zeng and Keitel proposed an arbitrated quan-
tum signature (AQS) scheme with the aid of a trusted
third party named arbitrator [3]. Afterwards, Li et al.
found that the arbitrator is unnecessary to entangle with
the other two participants in the AQS scheme presented
in Ref. [3] and thus the three-particle entangled GHZ
states used in the scheme can be replaced with two-
particle entangled Bell states [4]. In addition, the prepa-
ration and distribution of Bell states are much easier
to be implemented than that of GHZ states with the
present-day technologies. So, Li et al. proposed a more
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efficient AQS scheme using Bell states [4]. Zou et al.
showed both the two schemes proposed in Ref. [3] and
Ref. [4] are insecure since they could be repudiated by
the receiver Bob and presented two AQS schemes claimed
to fix the secure problem [5]. But Hwang et al. pointed
out in Ref. [6] that the arbitrator cannot solve the dis-
pute between the signatory Alice and the receiver Bob
when Bob claims a failure in the verification phase of the
scheme proposed by Zou et al. Besides, some other se-
curity problems of these typical AQS schemes were also
been discovered [7–10].
In this paper, we study security of all the above men-
tioned AQS schemes [3–5] and find that a common prob-
lem existing in the AQS schemes: different receivers can
exchange their signed messages and the corresponding
signatures arbitrarily, and thus they can deny the ac-
ceptance of the signature of an appointed message. The
reason why this security problem exist is also analyzed
in detail and the two AQS schemes presented by Zou et
al. [5] are selected as examples to study. In addition, we
also discussed some potential improvement methods for
enhancing the security of AQS schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I
introduces the AQS scheme with entangled states given
in Ref. [5] and analyzes its security. Section II deals
with the AQS scheme without entangled states proposed
by Zou et al. in [5]. Some discussions for improving the
security of AQS schemes are given in Sec. III. The last
section concludes the paper.
I. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE AQS
SCHEME WITH ENTANGLED STATES
In this section, we will briefly introduce the AQS
scheme with entangled states proposed in Ref. [5], and
then present security analysis on it.
2A. The AQS scheme with entangled states
The AQS scheme with entangled states proposed by
Zou et al. in Ref. [5] involves three participants, namely
signatory Alice, receiver Bob, and the arbitrator, and
consists of three phases: the initializing phase, the sign-
ing phase, and the verifying phase, which are described
as follows.
A. The initializing phase
Step I1: The arbitrator shares keys KA and KB with
Alice and Bob, respectively, through quantum key distri-
bution protocols proposed in Refs. [11, 12], which have
been proved to be unconditionally secure [13, 14].
Step I2: Alice generates N Bell states |ψ〉 =
(|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, · · · , |ψN 〉) with |ψi〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉AB + |11〉AB),
where the subscripts A and B correspond to Alice and
Bob, respectively. Then she distributes one particle of
each Bell state to Bob employing a secure and authenti-
cated method [2, 15].
B. The signing phase
Step S1: Alice transforms the message |P 〉 into |P ′〉 =
Er(|P 〉) according to a randomly chosen number r ∈
{00, 01, 10, 11}N.
Step S2: Alice generates |SA〉 = EKA(|P
′〉).
Step S3: Alice combines each message state and the
Bell state to obtain the three-particle entangled state
|φi〉 = |p
′
i
〉 ⊗ |ψi〉
= 1
2
{|φ+12〉A(αi|0〉B + βi|1〉B)
+|φ−12〉A(αi|0〉B − βi|1〉B)
+|ψ+12〉A(αi|1〉B + βi|0〉B)
+|ψ−12〉A(αi|1〉B − βi|0〉B)},
(1)
where |φ+12〉A, |φ
−
12〉A, |ψ
+
12〉A, and |ψ
−
12〉A represent the
four Bell states respectively [16].
Step S4: Alice implements a Bell measurement on each
|φi〉 and obtains MA = (M
1
A
,M2
A
, · · · ,MN
A
), where M i
A
represents one of the four Bell states.
Step S5: Alice transmits the signature |S〉 =
(|P ′〉, |SA〉, |MA〉) to Bob.
C. The verifying phase
Step V 1: Bob encrypts |P ′〉 and |SA〉 using the keyKB
and sends the resultant outcome |YB〉 = EKB (|P
′〉, |SA〉)
to the arbitrator.
Step V 2: The arbitrator decrypts |YB〉 with KB and
gets |P ′〉 and |SA〉. Then he encrypts |P ′〉 with KA and
obtains ST . If |ST 〉 = |SA〉, the arbitrator sets the veri-
fication parameter V = 1, otherwise sets V = 0.
Step V 3: The arbitrator obtains |P ′〉 from |ST 〉 and
sends the encrypted results |YT 〉 = EKB (|P
′〉, |SA〉, r) to
Bob.
Step V 4: Bob decrypts |YT 〉 and obtains |P
′〉, |SA〉,
and r. If r = 0, Bob rejects the signature, otherwise Bob
makes further verification.
Step V 5: According to Alice’s measurement outcomes
MA and Eq. (1), Bob obtains |P
′
B
〉 via teleportation. If
|P ′
B
〉 6= |P ′〉, Bob rejects the signature, else informs Alice
to publish r.
Step V 6: Alice announces r through the pubic board.
Step V 7: Bob recovers |P 〉 from |P ′〉 according to r
and takes (|SA〉, r) as the final signature of the message
|P 〉.
B. Security analysis
Hwang et al. presented the deniability dilemma in the
above AQS scheme [6]. They found the arbitrator cannot
solve the dispute if Bob claims |P ′
B
〉 6= |P ′〉 in Step V 5
since the following three cases may occur: 1) Bob told
a lie; 2) Alice sent a incorrect information to Bob; and
3) Eve disturbed the communication. However, if Bob
made such an allegation, the verification process cannot
be completed and a new signature task should be started.
So, here we show that the receiver Bob can repudiate the
acceptance of a signature related to a given message after
finishing the verification process successfully.
First let Alice sign the message |P 〉B for Bob and the
message |P 〉C for Charlie. Actually, |P 〉B is favorable
to Charlie, and |P 〉C is beneficial to Bob. Then Bob
and Charlie can be shown to exchange their messages
and the corresponding signatures by using the following
method. In step I2, after Alice distributes particles of
Bell states to Bob and Charlie, Bob and Charlie exchange
the particles they get. Similarly, after step S5, Bob sends
the qubit string |S〉B = (|P
′〉B , |SA〉B , |MA〉B) to Char-
lie and Charlie returns |S〉C = (|P
′〉C , |SA〉C , |MA〉C) to
Bob. Then Bob can verify the validity of the signature
|SA〉C for the message |P 〉C with the help of the arbitra-
tor, and Charlie can check whether |SA〉B is the signa-
ture of |P 〉B with the aid of the arbitrator. Obviously, if
Alice’s signatures are valid, Bob and Charlie can finish
the verification processes successfully. After that, Bob
gets Alice’s signature for the message |P 〉C and Char-
lie obtains Alice’s signature related to the message |P 〉B.
Therefore, even if there are disagreements between Alice
and Bob or between Alice and Charlie afterwards, Bob
still can deny accepting the signature |SA〉B of the mes-
sage |P 〉B , and Charlie also can disavow the acceptance
of the signature |SA〉C related to the message |P 〉C . Fur-
thermore, the arbitrator is not able to settle the dispute
since they passed the verification processes.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE AQS
SCHEME WITHOUT ENTANGLED STATES
This section reviews the AQS scheme without entan-
gled states proposed by Zou et al. in Ref. [5], and then
analyzes the security of the scheme.
3A. The AQS scheme without entangled states
The AQS scheme without entangled states also in-
volves three participants, namely signatory Alice, re-
ceiver Bob, and the arbitrator, and consists of the fol-
lowing three phases.
A. The initializing phase
Step I1: The arbitrator shares keys KA and KB with
Alice and Bob, respectively. In addition, Alice and Bob
shares the key KAB.
B. The signing phase
Step S1: Alice chooses a random number r ∈ {0, 1}2N
and computes |P ′〉 = Er(|P 〉) and |RAB〉 =MKAB(|P
′〉).
Step S2: Alice generates |SA〉 = EKA(|P
′〉).
Step S3: Alice generates the signature |S〉 =
EKAB (|P
′〉, |RAB〉, |SA〉) and transmits it to Bob.
C. The verifying phase
Step V 1: Bob obtains |P ′〉, |RAB〉, and |SA〉 by de-
crypting |S〉 with the key KAB. Then he generates
|YB〉 = EKB (|P
′〉, |SA〉) and sends it to the arbitrator.
Step V 2: The arbitrator decrypts |YB〉 with KB and
gets |P ′〉 and |SA〉.
Step V 3: The arbitrator obtains |P ′
T
〉 from |SA〉 and
compares it with |P ′〉. If |P ′
T
〉 = |P ′〉, he sets the verifi-
cation parameter VT = 1, else sets VT = 0. The arbitra-
tor announces the value of VT via the public board. If
VT = 1, he reproduces YB and resends it to Bob.
Step V 4: If VT = 0, Bob rejects the signature, other-
wise Bob decrypts |YB〉 and obtains |P
′〉 and |SA〉. Then
he computes |P ′
B
〉 =M−1
KAB
(|RAB〉) and compares it with
|P ′〉. If |P ′
B
〉 = |P ′〉, he sets the verification parameter
VB = 1, else sets VB = 0. Bob announces the value of
VB via the public board.
Step V 5: If VB = 0, Alice and the arbitrator abort the
scheme, otherwise Alice announces r through the public
board.
Step V 6: Bob recovers |P 〉 from |P ′〉 by r and takes
(|SA〉, r) as Alice’s final signature of the message |P 〉.
B. Security analysis
In this subsection, we show that the arbitrator also
cannot solve the disagreements between signatory and
receiver for the AQS scheme without entangled states if
the following case happens.
Suppose Alice intend to sign the message |P 〉 for Bob.
Afterwards, Bob finds the message |P 〉 is useless or unfa-
vorable to him but beneficial to Charlie. Then by doing
the following steps, Charlie can get the signature for |P 〉
without being detected by Alice.
• First, when Bob receives |S〉 = EKAB (|P
′〉,
|RAB〉, |SA〉) related to the message |P 〉 from Al-
ice after step S3, he decrypts it with the key KAB
and obtains |P ′〉, |RAB〉, and |SA〉. In addition,
Bob gets another version of |P ′〉 by decrypting RAB
with the key KAB.
• Second, Bob transmits two versions of |P ′〉 and
|SA〉 to Charlie through an authenticated channel.
• Third, after Charlie has received what Bob sent, he
encrypts |P ′〉 and |SA〉 with the keyKC shared with
the arbitrator to obtain |YC〉 = EKC (|P
′〉, |SA〉).
• At last, the encrypted result |YC〉 is sent to the
arbitrator.
Apparently, Charlie can implement the verification pro-
cedure like a honest receiver and get the signature of |P 〉
if it is a valid one made by Alice. Furthermore, the ar-
bitrator and Alice cannot discover the fact. Therefore, if
there are disputes between Alice and Bob, Bob can deny
that he has accepted the signature of the message |P 〉,
and Charlie can claim the signature of |P 〉 does come
from Alice if disagreements between Alice and Charlie
exist.
III. POSSIBLE ENHANCEMENTS
In this section, we first analyze two reasons why AQS
schemes are easy to suffer deniability dilemma problem,
and then propose the corresponding improve methods.
One reason is that the signatory Alice cannot identify
the real receiver. In other words, there is no relationship
between the signed message and the real receiver. There-
fore, different receivers can exchange their messages and
the corresponding signatures arbitrarily and thus repu-
diate accepting signatures for appointed messages. An-
other reason is that when participants announce random
numbers or values of verification parameters, the identi-
ties of them and the announcement time are not pub-
lished together. So, the arbitrator cannot distinguish
which opened information is related to a specified mes-
sage during a certain period.
According to the above analysis, we can take the fol-
lowing three measures to enhance the security of AQS
schemes.
• First, the signatory Alice’s signature not only in-
cludes the message, but also the identity of the re-
ceiver. Although the property of receivers’ denia-
bility is not always necessary in a signature scheme,
it is quite useful in some special circumstances. For
instance, suppose Alice sign a contract with Bob for
a thousand dollars goods. If Bob can deny that he
has accepted the contract with the help of another
receiver Charlie and ask Alice to do the same thing
again, it is quite unfair for Alice.
• Second, when participants are required to announce
random numbers or values of verification parame-
ters, their identities and the announcement time
4should be also attached. So the arbitrator and the
signatory can distinguish when the verification of
signatures related to appointed messages is imple-
mented and who participate in the verification pro-
cess.
• Third, before the signatory Alice start a signature
procedure, she can tell the arbitrator who will be
the receiver at first.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown two typical AQS schemes
still suffer the security problem, namely receivers can
deny any signature for an appointed message after the
AQS procedures have been completed successfully. That
is because a signed message is unrelated to a receiver,
which allows different receivers to interchange their mes-
sages and the corresponding signatures arbitrarily. In ad-
dition, some countermeasures also have been presented to
fix such a security problem. Whether these countermea-
sures can overcome all the security problems discovered
in Refs. [7–10] and how to design an AQS scheme which
can withstand existing or potential attacks deserve fur-
ther research.
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